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Looking to the Future:
The Scope, Value and
Operationalization of
International Human Rights Law
Lorna McGregor*
ABSTRACT
The international human rights system of which
international human rights law (IHRL) is a part has been
critiqued for being ineffective, too legal, insufficiently self-critical,
and elitist, with some claiming that it self-generates ome of the
challenges it faces. This Article challenges this presentation of
IHRL and in doing so, sets out three priorities for its future
development. These are first, that it should continue to engage in
critical analysis of how IHRL can effectively respond to the
complex and multifactorial challenges it faces. Second, rather
than refrain from developing due to critiques of overexpansion,
IHRL should prioritize the articulation and adaptation of how
IHRL applies to groups who struggle to enjoy their rights in
practice and to new contexts and global challenges, such as
artificial intelligence. Third, it should develop and deepen the
methodology to the operationalization of IHRL further to ensure
that it embeds within the agendas of key actors that can bring
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about change, including across state agencies as well as within
businesses and social movements.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 1282
II. THE FUTURE OF IHRL I: EFFECTIVELY DIAGNOSING
AND ADDRESSING THE MULTILAYERED THREATS TO
HUMVIAN RIGHTS ...................................... 1286
A. Scrutinizing the Validity of Claims that
Backlash is Self-Generated....................... 1287
B. Recognizing the Complexity and
Multifactorial Nature of Backlash........... 1289
C. Recognizing Human Rights as a Self-
Reflective Field............. ........... 1291
III. THE FUTURE OF IHRL II: PRIORITIZING THE
INTERPRETATION AND ADAPTATION OF IHRL TO
PARTICULAR GROUPS AND NEW CONTEXTS............. 1294
IV. THE FUTURE OF IHRL III: OPERATIONALIZATION AND
REVALUING LAW AND THE COURTS ..................... 1300
A. Implementation of Human Rights ........... 1301
B. Revaluing Courts ...................... 1310
V. CONCLUSION......................................... 1313
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, scholarship has burgeoned on the challenges faced
by the international human rights system. This literature has critically
assessed the effectiveness and impact of international human rights
law (IHRL).1 These themes are often examined through the lens of
compliance with treaty commitments and implementation, referring
to both the "legal implementation," of the decisions or
recommendations of international human rights bodies,2 and "the
1. See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN
RIGHTS WORK IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Princeton Univ. Press 2019); Rebekah Thomas et
al., Assessing the Impact of a Human Rights-Based Approach across a Spectrum of
Change for Women's, Children's, and Adolescent's Health, 17 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 11
(2015) (discussing the challenges with measuring human rights impact due to the
integration of human rights into policies and practices but also the need to measure
individual, structural and societal change).
2. See, e.g., COURTNEY HILLEBRECHT, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNALS: THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE 504-17 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2014); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 114-24 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009); Cossette Creamer & Beth
Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights: Quality of Participation in the Convention
against Torture, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 579, 583 (2015); Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting
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operational delivery of human rights within communities and
beyond."3 Scholars have analyzed the mainstreaming of human rights
beyond institutions and agencies with a dedicated mandate on human
rights, for example, mainstreaming human rights throughout the
United Nations (UN). 4 Some have focused on the "pushback" and
"backlash" experienced by parts of the system.5 This has included
critiques of the international human rights system, particularly the
global institutions established to promote and protect human rights
and international human rights law (IHRL). The system has been
invariably critiqued for being ineffective, too legal, insufficiently self-
critical, and elitist.6 As a result, some claim that the system self-
generates some of the challenges it faces.7 IHRL and its related
institutions have also been criticized both for overexpansion of rights
and for addressing the human rights implications of enduring and
emerging global challenges, such as climate change, artificial
intelligence, and inequality.8
This Article challenges these critiques and in doing so, identifies
three priorities for the future of JHRL, if it is to remain an effective
branch of international law mandated to promote and protect human
rights. This Article first examines the claim that the international
human rights system is insufficiently self-critical and generates many
Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court's Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 505 (2011).
3. For an extensive discussion of these terms, see Paul Hunt, Configuring the
UN Human Rights System in the "Era of Implementation": Mainland and Archipelago,
39 HuM. RTS. Q. 489, 497 (2017).
4. Geoff Gilbert & Anna Magdalena Rusch, Rule of Law and United Nations
Interoperability, 30 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 31 (2018).
5. Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Wiebusch, Backlash Against
International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International
Courts, 14 INT'L J.L. CONTEXT 197, 198 (2018) (arguing "there is a difference between
mere pushback from individual Member States or other actors, seeking to influence the
future direction of an IC's case-law and actual backlash in terms of critique triggering
significant institutional reform or even the dismantling of tribunals, the latter typically
involving the collective action of Member States"); see also Malcolm Langford, Critiques
of Human Rights, 14 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 69, 70 (2018) (observing that while
critiques of human rights are not new, the volume has increased as has the "apocalyptic
predictions").
6. See STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE END TIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 4-5 (Cornell
Univ. Press 2013) (arguing the international system is too international); ERIC POSNER,
THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 137 (2014) (arguing the system is ineffective);
Andrew Fagan, The Gentrification of Human Rights, 41 HUM. RTS. Q. 283, 285 (2019)
(arguing the international system is too elite); Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the
Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279, 314 (2017).
7. See John Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights from Human Rights Law, 52
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1167, 1168 (2019).
8. See, e.g., HURST HANNUM, RESCUING HUMAN RIGHTS: A RADICALLY
MODERATE APPROACH (2019) (critiquing international human rights law for being overly
expansive in dealing with every "social issue"); SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN
RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (Harv. Univ. Press 2018) (critiquing human rights for
not dealing with inequality).
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of the pressures it is experiencing.9 It questions this proposition and
suggests that a priority for IHRL is to diagnose the complex and
multifactorial threats to human rights and critically assess how it can
best contribute to addressing these threats. Part II makes this point in
three ways. First, claims that IHRL and its related institutions
constitute a major source of pushback and backlash have to be
approached with care as history demonstrates the potential for states
and other actors to levy criticisms at IHRL and its institutions as a
means of pursuing particular political agendas, rather than revealing
intrinsic deficiencies within IHRL. Second, pushback and backlash on
the international human rights system are multifactorial and variable
depending on the actor, issue, and point in time. It is difficult,
therefore, to make generalized or universally applicable statements
about the weight of particular pressures.1 0 Moreover, apportioning
responsibility for pushback and backlash to "internal pressures" risks
underplaying the significant structural factors, global challenges, and
shifts in scope conditions that currently present major threats to
human rights and need to be addressed. Third, the multidisciplinary
scholarship on human rights, particularly in relation to compliance,
implementation, and mainstreaming, displays a critical edge and is
increasingly engaged with in an interdisciplinary manner, including
within international legal literature. This scholarship thus displaces
the inference made by some scholars that the international human
rights system lacks self-reflection by overly focusing on external
threats but is rather engaged in critical analysis of how to address the
complex challenges faced by human rights. In this regard, this Article
suggests that rather than trying to compartmentalize potential sources
of pressure on IHRL based on whether they are "internal" or "external,"
a priority for the future of IHRL is to diagnose the range of threats to
human rights and to critically assess the extent to which the
international human rights system-which includes, but is not limited
to IHRL-can effectively anticipate these threats and societal needs.
In Part III, this Article argues that a second priority for IHRL is
to develop effective approaches to interpreting how IHRL applies to
groups who are unable to enjoy their rights in practice, such as the
current debates on the rights of older persons, as well as to adapt
existing IHRL to new contexts, such as climate change and artificial
intelligence. Rather than respond to critiques of the "endless" or "over-
expansion"" of IHRL by freezing its development, IHRL needs to
ensure that it continues to apply and remain relevant where human
rights are at risk. This can be achieved by demonstrating that IHRL
rarely expands to pronounce entirely new rights, although in
9. See Tasioulas, supra note 7.
10. See Karima Bennoune, In Defense of Human Rights, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1209 (2019) (discussing the use of general statements).
11. HANNUM, supra note 8, at 32.
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exceptional circumstances this will be appropriate. Rather, most
activity labelled as "expansion" is more accurately characterized as the
articulation of how existing IHRL applies to particular groups or new
contexts. This distinction needs to be made much clearer so that the
articulation and application of IHRL to particular groups and new
contexts through interpretative and adaptive techniques, is prioritized
in order to ensure that IHRL remains relevant and resilient to the
needs of changing societies. This point is often missed by commentators
who argue that IHRL endlessly expands in a generalized manner
without assessment the type of instruments being created.
In Part IV, this Article acknowledges that IHRL cannot address
the threats posed to human rights on its own, but rather a
multidisciplinary approach continues to be required, particularly
where the threats emanate from changes in scope and structural
conditions in society or relate to global challenges, such as artificial
intelligence and climate change.12 However, IHRL stands a better
chance of forming a part of wider approaches where it is embedded
within the agendas, policies, and practices of actors that are in a
position to impact human rights.13 In this regard, the
operationalization dimension to the implementation of IHRL will
remain central to the future agenda of the branch. As major actors
within and across states, the operationalization of human rights by
businesses continues to be critical. In addition, operationalization of
IHRL within the different levels of the state reflects an underexamined
part of the implementation agenda. This includes ministries beyond
the foreign office and the ministry of justice,14 as well as at the local
and the municipal levels. The operationalization of IHRL also needs to
be considered in relation to the agendas of social movements, and in
dealing with global challenges. This is not with the view to expand or
change IHRL, but to articulate the value added of including IHRL
within wider approaches to social and political change. The
multidisciplinary, multilevel, mainstreaming, and operationalization
of human rights all introduce new layers of complexity, particularly
from a management perspective, as the international human rights
system now constitutes a complex and diffuse regime. The development
12. See Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, The Future of Human Rights: From
Gatekeeping to Symbiosis, 20 SUR - INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 499, 502 (2014) (noting that
"important topics such as climate change, which profoundly affect human rights ...
cannot be understood or acted upon without the participation of professionals from other
fields.").
13. This is the approach adopted, for example, by the EU. EU Action Plan on
Human Rights and Democracy, COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 31-36 (Dec. 2015),
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-action-plan-on-human-rights-and-democrac
y-en_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GYX-RW1VV (archived Sept. 16, 2019).
14. See Hunt, supra note 3, 511-12 (discussing the use of various specialized
agencies "brought into relationship with the United Nations").
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of synergies within the system therefore reflects a key dimension that
will impact the future of IHRL.
By focusing on implementation (particularly operationalization),
the international human rights system is also able to respond to
another sustained critique, which is the claim that it overly focuses on
courts. The operationalization of human rights requires a plurality of
methods and approaches. Such pluralization thereby relieves the
pressure and expectation placed on courts to be one of the main or only
means of realizing human rights. Recognition of the place of courts
within a plural methodology may then create space for the revaluing
of the critical role that courts have played in the development of IHRL
and the delivery of justice for individuals and groups. This point is
often missed in scholarship and in practice with courts, often depicted
negatively due to the absence or the inadequacy of other structures.
Since judicial approaches to human rights typically work best when
part of wider strategies, the pluralization of methods should enhance
the effectiveness of courts.15
II. THE FUTURE OF IHRL I: EFFECTIVELY DIAGNOSING AND
ADDRESSING THE MULTILAYERED THREATS TO HUMAN RIGHTS
Responding to recent lectures on the future of IHRL by Philip
Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human
Rights, and Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, who was, at the time, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, John Tasioulas has pointed to "a
startling omission."16 He argues that both authors examine "external"
threats to human rights, such as populism, but neither "contemplates
the possibility that some of the most serious pressures on IHRL are
internally generated, pressures arising from serious defects in the
elaboration of human rights law and the self-understanding of its
practitioners and scholars."17 He charges the internally generated
pressures within IHRL with the "breeding [of] scepticism about human
rights law that may end up becoming, by a foreseeable if not justifiable
process of blowback, scepticism about human rights morality itself."
18
15. See Bennoune, supra note 10; see also James T. Gathii, Variation in the Use
of Subregional Integration Courts between Business and Human Rights Actors: The Case
of the East African Court of Justice, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 60-61 (2019) (noting
that more than just litigation is necessary and a goal of compliance should only be "one
of a broader set of strategies in the effort to democratize authoritarian societies").
16. See Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Speech at
the BIICL Annual Grotius Lecture: Is International Human Rights Law Under Threat?
(July 26, 2017) (transcript available at the British Institute of International and
Comparative Law); Tasioulas, supra note 7 (discussing Philip Alston, The Populist
Challenge to Human Rights, 9 J. HUM. RTs. PRAC. 1, 1-15 (2017)).
17. See Tasioulas, supra note 7; Al Hussein, supra note 16.
18. See Tasioulas, supra note 7; Al Hussein, supra note 16.
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Tasioulas therefore attributes significant responsibility for the current
pushback and backlash on human rights to IHRL and its institutions
rather than external factors.19
This Part of the Article examines the claim that the pushback on
human rights is "self-generated" by showing how claims of self-
generation can often be used as a distraction technique and overlook
the current critical approaches to IHRL from within. This Part also
suggests that such an apportionment of responsibility for "blowback"
on human rights risks diverting attention away from the complex and
multifactorial reasons for pushback. It suggests that rather than
seeking to attribute responsibility for pushback to "internal" or
"external" sources, the international human rights system needs to
prioritize the development of effective ways in which to address the
range and complexity of challenges the system is facing.
A. Scrutinizing the Validity of Claims that Backlash is Self-Generated
Claims that IHRL self-generates pushback and backlash require
close scrutiny, as states and other actors have sometimes levied
criticisms at IHRL and its institutions, not because of an intrinsic
failing, but as a vehicle for the pursuit of a particular set of domestic
politics. For example, Sonia Cardenas shows how norm collision can
materialize in different sociopolitical contexts raising the potential for
pushback, and even backlash, against human rights. 20 States can build
counterdiscourse21 by critiquing the international human rights
system, IHRL or its institutions, claiming that they are overreaching,
unduly interfering in domestic affairs, or adopting overly evolutive
interpretations of the law.2 2 Such an approach presents the system,
including IHRL and its institutions, as "part of the problem," whereas
it may actually be a guise or vehicle for the promotion of a particular
political position.
Scholars have used European Court of Human Rights decisions on
prisoner voting to make this point.2 3 Following the then Prime
Minister David Cameron's claim that prison voting made him feel
19. See Tasioulas, supra note 7; Al Hussein, supra note 16.
20. See generally SONIA CARDENAS, CONFLICT AND COMPLIANCE: STATE
RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRESSURE (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007).
21. This term is taken from Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Introduction and
Overview, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO
COMPLIANCE 5 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
22. See Campbell McLachlan, The Assault on International Adjudication and the
Limits of Withdrawal, 68 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 499, 513-16 (2019) (discussing and
critiquing these arguments).
23. Zoe Jay, Keeping Rights at Home: British Conceptions of Rights and
Compliance with the European Court of Human Rights, 19 BRIT. J. POL. & INT'L REL.
(2017).
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"physically ill," 24 commentators questioned whether these cases are
representative of the European Court overreaching itself, particularly
as it appeared to lead to "inter-state contagion" with Russia following
suit.25 Zoe Jay challenges such an account.2
6 She observes that the
United Kingdom has a high level of compliance with the decisions of
the European Court, which indicates that it is not generally opposed to
the court. However, the British government tends to push back against
cases that touch on issues that are deemed controversial domestically.
She argues that this is not because the court has overreached itself but
because certain decisions conflict with a domestic narrative of human
rights that is different from the European Court's.
2 7 She argues that
cases, such as those on prisoner voting and deportation, fall into this
category because they involve "criminals and terrorists."
28 This means
that the cases result in pushback not because of the position of the
European Court per se but because of a domestic political view based
on parliamentary sovereignty and a claim that a "foreign" court does
not understand "British values."
29
However, these critiques of IHRL and its institutions, and the
wider system, can shift.3 0 This is possible because the critiques are
rooted in political positions which can change and are also not
necessarily representative of all political positions or parts of the state.
For example, Alice Donald has pointed out that the British government
has so far failed to implement the European Court of Human Rights'
decision on prisoner voting. However, a joint committee of both houses
of parliament drafted a bill on the voting eligibility of prisoners as a
means of implementing the decision.3 ' This both underscores that
states are not monoliths and that where the composition of the part of
24. Alex Aldridge, Can 'Physically Ill" David Cameron Find a Cure for His
European Allergy?, GUARDIAN, May 6, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/
may/06/david-cameron-european-law-allergy [https://perma.cc/4CB6-NKHF] (archived
Sept. 4, 2019).
25. Philip Leach & Alice Donald, Russia Defies Strasbourg: Is Contagion
Spreading?, EJIL TALK! (Dec. 19, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-defies-
strasbourg-is-contagion-spreading/ [https://perma.cc/KEP8-B7A8] (archived Sept. 4,
2019).
26. Jay, supra note 23.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International
Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 411, 418 (2013).
29. Id.
30. Alice Donald, Tackling Non-Implementation in the Strasbourg System: The
Art of the Possible?, EJIL TALK! (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/tackling-non-
implementation-in-the-strasbourg-system-the-art-of-the-possible/ [https://perma.cc/KV7
6-XY3B] (archived Sept. 4, 2019); see also Dia Anagnostou & Alina Mungiu-Pippidi,
Domestic Implementation of Human Rights Judgments in Europe: Legal Infrastructure
and Government Effectiveness Matter, 25 EUR. J. INT'L L. 205 (2014); Courtney Hillbrecht,
The Power of Human Rights Tribunals: Compliance with The European Court of Human
Rights and Domestic Policy Change, 20 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 1100 (2014).
31. See Donald, supra note 30.
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the state opposed to a decision by an international court changes, the
position on implementation may also change. In this regard, backlash
against the international rule of law often results from objections to
legal interpretations (even well established and previously
uncontroversial) that do not fit with contemporary, local politics and
the self-identity of a state rather than jurisprudence that might be
framed as pushing at the edges.
This is particularly important as while IHRL and its institutions
require some level of sensitivity, a balance also has to be struck in how
far they should-and are willing-to adapt to political pushback and
backlash or claims that they have "'caused" the backlash, as this may
be tied to the politics of the day.3 2 Moreover, pushback and backlash
can also sharpen and trigger a countermovement by other states and
nonstate actors in support of the international rule of law. This can
include the emergence of new supporters and leaders of international
law within states and beyond. For example, Steven Jensen points to
moments in history in which smaller states have turned the course of
history and garnered support for the international rule of law in the
face of challenge.33 This connects to a recent assessment of the future
of the International Criminal Court in which Mark Kersten asks
whether the court has gone too far towards practicalities in order to
illustrate its impact and effectiveness and in doing so, has lost some of
the aspiration that was at the heart of its establishment.34 Accordingly,
claims that "internal pressures" are the cause (fully, partially, or at all)
of backlash require critical assessment and location with more complex
and nuanced readings of the relationship between the local and the
international at any moment in time.3 5
B. Recognizing the Complexity and Multifactorial Nature of Backlash
Claims that some of the most serious pressures to IHRL are self-
generated risks underplaying the complexity and multifactorial nature
of the current backlash on international law and global governance, of
which IHRL and its institutions are a part.3 6 It also fails to engage with
32. See KAREN J. ALTER, NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS 335-66 (Princeton Univ. Press 2014); see also Langford, supra note 5,
at 79.
33. STEVEN L.B. JENSEN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE 1960s,
DECOLONIZATION, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL VALUES (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2016); see also ANN MARIE CLARK, DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE: AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS (Princeton Univ. Press 2001).
34. Mark Kersten, Whither the Aspirational ICC, Welcome the "Practical" Court?,
EJIL TALK! (May 22, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/whither-the-aspirational-icc-
welcome-the-practical-court/ [https://perma.cc/R6TX-BD48] (archived Sept. 4, 2019).
35. See THE HUMAN RIGHTS PARADOx: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3-
28 (Stern et al. eds., Univ. of Wisconsin Press 2014).
36. See THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAw: RISE OR DECLINE? (Heike Krieger et
al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2019); Philip Alston, The Populist Challenge to Human
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the importance of changes or pressures on 'enabling' environments,"3 7
or what Thomas Risse and Stephen Ropp refer to as "scope conditions"
for the realization with human rights.38
Risse and Ropp identify five scope conditions that impact the
realizability of human rights. First, they observe that "regime type
[democratic or authoritarian] seems to matter."39 This not only applies
with regard to the regime type generally but also in relation to the
existence and role of social mechanisms, including courts ("domestic,
foreign or international") that "would bring democracies back into
compliance," as well as "mechanisms of persuasion, naming and
shaming [which] are particularly effective with regard to stable
democratic regimes."40 They identify the second scope condition as
whether states have "the kinds of efficient and effective administrative
structures and institutions that would allow them to enforce and
implement central decisions."41 They frame the third condition as
whether "rule implementation" is centralized or decentralized given
that states are not "unitary actors."42 They characterize the fourth
scope condition as material power, and the fifth as social pressure.
43
They suggest hat the last two scope conditions can "relate to any given
rule target's vulnerability to external (as well as domestic) pressure."
44
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al. similarly emphasize the role of scope
conditions in the realization of human rights, particularly by asking
"what aspects of democracy are most consequential in improving a
state's human rights record."45 They find that "full" democracy,
accountability, and "political participation at the level of multiparty
competition" are most central to the delivery of human rights.
46
In their lectures, Alston and Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein not only focus
on the significant shifts that are occurring globally in the scope
Rights, 9 J. HUM. RTs. PRACT. 1, 1-15 (2017); Douglas Guilfoyle, The Future of
International Law in an Authoritarian World, EJIL TALK! (June 3, 2019),
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-future-of-international-law-in-an-authoritarian-world/
[https://perma.cclD5RE-HGLF] (archived Sept. 4, 2019) (outlining some critiques of
international law); Madsen, Cebulak & Wiebusch, supra note 5, at 198 (discussing that
commentators often explain backlash "en bloc" rather than unpacking the different types
of "pushback" and "backlash"); Al Hussein, supra note 16; McLachlan, supra note 22, at
499.
37. Thomas et al., supra note 1, at 12.
38. See Risse & Ropp, supra note 21, at 5; see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks,
How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE
L.J. 621, 621-703 (2004); CARDENAS, supra note 20.
39. See Risse & Ropp, supra note 21, at 16.
40. See id. at 17.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 18.
43. See id. at 20.
44. See id.
45. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at
Democracy and Human Rights, 49 INT'L STUD. Q. 439, 439 (2005).
46. See id.
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conditions identified by Risse and Ropp and Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
but they also identify other structural, political, and social factors that
are combining to create serious challenges for human rights, such as
populism, poverty, and inequality.4 7 These sit together with other
factors, such as the role of multinational companies, and enduring and
emerging global challenges, such as climate change and artificial
intelligence, all of which have serious implications for the enjoyment
of human rights.
In such a context, narrowing or overweighting responsibility for
backlash against human rights to one source-whether "internal" or
"external"-overlooks the scale, complexity, and multifactorial nature
of pushback and backlash and its connectedness to wider structural,
social, and political contexts. It suggests that blowback can be
understood (and thus resolved) in a one-dimensional way. Yet, a range
of actors take issue with the international human rights system,
including IHRL, for different reasons and at different points in time.4 8
Some may reject the system entirely; others may take issue with a
particular aspect, such as a specific decision, and generalize a position
against the system, an institution, or IHRL from there; and still others
may be supportive of some aspects of the system but not others.49
Accordingly, the priority for the future of IHRL and the international
human rights system more generally, is to assess how to effectively
address the pushback in all its complexity.
C. Recognizing Human Rights as a Self-Reflective Field
The preceding sections have demonstrated the range and
complexity of the challenges facing the international human rights
system. In such contexts, critical assessments of the threats to human
rights and how to effectively respond to them are needed in scholarship
and practice.50 However, some commentators, characterize human
rights scholars and practitioners as displaying an "uncritical
enthusiasm"5 1 for legalization and judicialization. This critique can be
interpreted on two levels. First, it carries negative connotations about
legalization and judicialization of human rights that risk diminishing
the critical achievement of both acts in transforming human rights
from "interests" to rights that can be claimed.52 Second, it suggests that
47. Al Hussein, supra note 16; Alston, supra note 36.
48. See Langford, supra note 5 (for a detailed overview of different critiques,
including from different disciplinary perspectives).
49. See Madsen, Cebulak & Wiebusch, supra note 5, at 197 (noting that backlash
is often used as a universal term, whereas there is a difference between pushback and
backlash).
50. See Bennoune, supra note 10.
51. See Tasioulas, supra note 7.
52. Hannah Hilligoss, Filippo A. Raso & Vivek Krishnamurthy, It's not enough
for AI to be "ethical", it must also be "rights respecting", MEDIUM (Oct. 9, 2018),
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human rights scholarship lacks the critical edge necessary to assess
how it should adapt and respond, including through self-reflection and
without being reactive, to significant and complex changes in society
that are presenting serious risks to human rights.
In the earlier phases of the international human rights system-
as a staged work in progress-the focus was on standard setting and
the building of institutions, many of which took the form of (quasi-)
judicial bodies.5 3 At least at the international level, there was a leaning
towards law building and ex post-facto accountability through the
litigation of human rights claims.54 However, this phase should not be
interpreted as a fetishization or monopolization process by law but
rather as a critical achievement in the categorization of human
interests into legally claimable rights.55 As Hurst Hannum recognizes
in his recent monograph, "the notion that all people in the world
possess certain rights - which their own government is obliged to
protect - was nothing short of revolutionary."56 This point is often
overlooked in critiques of IHRL (which for some are in any case,
"overstated,"%5 which fail to properly engage with the impact the
conferring of legal rights and their protection through legal processes
has meant, symbolically and practically, for many people whose rights
have been infringed.5 8 The achievement and importance of the
legalization of human rights should therefore not be underplayed as
their conversion from ethical principles or human interests to legal
rights that can be claimed was-and continues to be-groundbreaking
and transformative across the globe.
The question arises, however,whether appreciation of the role of
legalization necessarily equates to a lack of critical thinking about the
law and judicial institutions. In the past, human rights scholarship has
been criticized for splitting between high optimism and significant
criticism,59 rather than taking a more nuanced approach to the field.
60
https://medium.comlberkman-klein-center/its-not-enough-for-ai-to-be-ethical-it-must-
also-be-rights-respecting-b87f7e215b97 [https://perma.cclM7HD-N83V] (archived Sept.
4, 2019) (for a contemporary example of the role of international human rights law in
regulating artificial intelligence, noting that noted that "the human rights regime
provides the clarity and certainty of law. It transforms voluntary promises of ethical
behavior into mandatory requirements for compliance with an established body of law.").
53. See Costas Douzinas, The Paradoxes of Human Rights, 20 CONSTELLATIONS
51, 57 (2013) (arguing that "[r]ights allow us to express our needs in language by
formulating them as a demand").
54. Id.
55. Id. at 64.
56. HANNUM, supra note 8, at 1; see also, Bennoune, supra note 10.
57. Id.
58. Gathii, supra note 15, at 46.
59. HUMAN RIGHTS FUTURES 1-3 (Stephen Hopgood et al. eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2017).
60. Fagan, supra note 6, at 285.
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However, the sustainability of claims that human rights
scholarship and practice lacks critical pathways can now be
questioned. While not necessarily labelled as critical scholarship on
human rights, the growth in literature and policy analysis on the
effectiveness, implementation, and mainstreaming of human rights
displays a critical and reflective edge, while still committing to the
normativity of human rights and the international human rights
system.6 1 This literature is multidisciplinary and increasingly
interdisciplinary, particularly with international legal scholarship
drawing on the work of other disciplines, such as political science,
sociology, and international relations.62 It represents a varied and
layered body of critical work that examines the factors that account for
the (in)effectiveness and (non)implementation of human rights, as well
as the relationship of human rights to wider social, political, and
economic contexts.63
Moreover, within international legal scholarship and practice,
while legalization and judicialization have long been recognized as a
critical component to realizing human rights, they have equally been
understood as insufficient on their own.64 This is because the
realization of human rights requires a much more complex and
multifactorial approach. This accounts for the emphasis in scholarship
and practice on creative and dynamic ways in which to realize human
rights, with a greater emphasis on a plurality of means to secure the
implementation, mainstreaming, acculturation, and orchestration of
human rights.6 5 This includes recent developments in the Human
Rights Council to pay more attention to prevention, which has
traditionally been neglected in favor of a focus on accountability.66
Indeed, reflecting on Philip Alston's lecture, Ron Dudai observes that,
there is always a need for nuanced criticism among human rights advocates;
while he distances himself from it, Alston's piece is itself, for me, actually a great
example of critical human rights scholarship: committed to the principles but
ready to engage in self-critique, questioning some long-held beliefs . .. but doing
61. See, e.g., HILLEBRECHT, supra note 1; Hunt, supra note 3.
62. See, e.g., HILLEBRECHT, supra note 1; Hunt, supra note 3.
63. See, e.g., HILLEBRECHT, supra note 1; Hunt, supra note 3.
64. See Gathii, supra note 15, at 37 (discussing the role of courts as an important
partner and catalyst); see also Bennoune, supra note 10, at 1223 ("Human rights scholars
and advocates who are not lawyers sometimes downplay the importance of law and legal
guarantees, which make up one set of tools-and sometimes a critical one-in the human
rights toolbox.").
65. See Tom Pegram, Global Human Rights Governance and Orchestration:
National Human Rights Institutions as Intermediaries, 21 EUR. J. INTL REL. 595, 595
(2015); Goodman & Jinks, supra note 38, at 625-26; HILLEBRECHT, supra note 1; Hunt,
supra note 3.
66. See Human Rights Council Res. 39/7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/L.8, at 1-2 (Sept.
21, 2018).
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it as a form of "insider critique" versed in the art and craft of human rights
practice.67
This is the type of (self-)reflective scholarship that is increasingly
evident in human rights scholarship and will be critical to assessments
of the threats to human rights and the ways in which the international
human rights system, with IHRL as a part, can effectively respond and
adapt to changing local, national, and global politics and power bases.
A key priority therefore for scholarship and practice is to intensify
critical studies into how to address the multifactorial nature of
pushback on human rights.
III. THE FUTURE OF IHRL II: PRIORITIZING THE INTERPRETATION AND
ADAPTATION OF IHRL TO PARTICULAR GROUPS AND NEW CONTEXTS
Beyond diagnosing and addressing pushback on the international
human rights system, a further priority for IHRL is the interpretation
and articulation of how IHRL applies to particular groups and to new
contexts. As discussed in this part of the Article, this is critical if IHRL
is to be effective and resilient in a changing world. This is an issue
which has not received sufficient attention.
In the last decade, there has been a distinct cautionary approach
to the adoption of new legal instruments. The reasons for caution in
the pursuit of new treaties vary but are often based on principled,
political, or pragmatic readings of what is possible.68 Some
commentators argue that, in the current climate, attempts to develop
a new law are not a good use of time and resources as they are unlikely
to come to fruition.6 9 Others argue that treaties should not be pursued
in political contexts in which there is a risk that states may regress
rather than progress existing international law, including by rolling
back on existing obligations.70 Moreover, as already discussed, IHRL
has moved much more towards compliance, implementation, and
mainstreaming of human rights.
71
While these reflect practical arguments against the pursuit of new
legal instruments, IHRL still needs to be capable of development, like
any branch of law. This is a particular need with regard to articulating
67. Ron Dudai, Human Rights in the Populist Era: Mourn then (Re)Organize, 9 J.
HUM. RTS. PRAC. 16, 20 (2017).
68. See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics
and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 889-91 (1998) (finding that a multitude of
pragmatic reasons limited the development of new norms).
69. Jane McAdam, Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change
Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer, 23 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 2, 8 (2011).
70. Id. at 25.
71. Press Release, Secretary-General Toasts to Era of Commitment and
Implementation, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/8379 (Sept. 12, 2002).
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how existing law applies to groups who are not able to enjoy their rights
effectively in practice and to new contexts or global challenges, such as
climate change or artificial intelligence. However, arguments against
the creation of new instruments, particularly when framed as the
"overextension" or "overexpansion" of IHRL to address "every social
problem"72 can have the effect of stymying efforts to articulate how
IHRL applies to these groups or contexts. This potentially creates a
rights-protection gap. In this regard, this Article suggests that a
distinction needs to be made between the creation of entirely new legal
rights and the implementation of existing rights, through the
articulation of how they apply to particular groups or new contexts.
While such articulation may require the adoption of new instruments,
the exercise is different in nature from the creation of new rights. The
ability to articulate how IHRL applies to particular groups and new
contexts is a critical dimension to the future of IHRL, if it is to offer
effective protection and adapt to a changing world. However, it has not
received sufficient attention as a particular category. Accordingly, a
key priority for the future of IHRL is to distinguish between the
normative development of IHRL and gap-filling exercises, requiring
the articulation, codification, application, or implementation of an
existing norm or the creation of an institution to support such
implementation. 7
For example, for particular groups, the articulation of how IHRL
applies is important because while these groups are already protected
under IHRL, they may not be able to enjoy their rights in practice.74
The exercise is therefore about specifying how existing IHRL applies
to enhance compliance by duty bearers and the ability to make rights
claims. Very often, the adoption of instruments in relation to the rights
of particular groups are mainly declaratory and explanatory of how
existing rights apply to particular groups,7 5 such as the Convention on
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the latter of which Frederic
Megret typologizes as an instrument which affirms, reformulates,
extends, and innovates in relation to existing rights.76 As a live debate,
the UN Open Ended Working Group on Ageing is currently examining
how to effectively protect the rights of older persons.7 7 A part of this
72. See HANNUM, supra note 8.
73. See Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L
ORG. 599, 634-39 (1986) (writing that many regimes are appealing enough but simply
need to be implemented).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Frederic Megret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with
Disabilities or a Disabilities Convention?, 30 HuM. RTS. Q. 494, 516 (2008).
77. See U.N. Programme on Ageing, Open-ended Working Group on Ageing for
the purpose of strengthening the protection of the human rights of older persons, DEP'T
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discussion is whether a treaty on the rights of older persons is
needed.7 8 While this has been dismissed by some, including human
rights actors, as unnecessary, the argument has also been made that a
treaty would enable the articulation of how existing IHRL applies to
older persons, in order to affirm their existing rights, and would
provide monitoring mechanisms that would be attuned to the rights of
a group whose experience of human rights abuse is often overlooked by
traditional human rights groups.79 Advocacy for a new treaty should
not necessarily be read as an attempt to create "new" rights or extend
IHRL further, but it can rather be seen as an attempt to articulate the
application of IHRL to a particular group of people whose enjoyment of
their existing rights is often at risk.
Making clear distinctions between the creation of new human
rights and the articulation and adaptation of existing norms and
unpacking critiques of overextension is therefore critical if IHRL is to
effectively respond to protection gaps and new circumstances. On the
one hand, in some instances, attempts to frame an issue as a human
rights issue may be instrumental with the aim of benefiting from the
moral authority associated with human rights, as well as providing the
means to access national, regional, and international human rights
mechanisms.8 0 On the other hand, they can reflect critiques of taking
a human rights-based approach to a particular social or political
context or global challenge, such as poverty, climate change, or
artificial intelligence.8 1 Instrumental attempts to expand human
rights and IHRL can, of course, be resisted on the grounds that they
take the branch outside of its intended bounds. Dudai presents this as
a tension between "remaining relevant and aligned with the agendas
of contemporary social movements" and avoiding engaging in a
"superficial manner" and "creating more and more 'new' human
rights," as this can contribute to "diluting the human rights label."
8 2
However, concerns about instrumentalism, which can be
addressed, should not be overstated as it is critical for the future of
IHRL that it is agile and adaptable enough to be able to address new
ECON. & Soc. AFF., https//social.un.org/ageing-working-group/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/BCL8-L5JZ] (archived Sept. 4, 2019).
78. See generally G.A. Res. 67/139, Towards a Comprehensive and Integral
International Legal Instrument to Promote and Protect the Rights and Dignity of Older
Persons, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/139 (Feb. 13, 2013) (calling for an improved system to
protect the rights of the elderly).
79. Marijke De Pauw, Towards a New UN Convention on the Rights of Older
Persons, BERKELEY J. INT'L L. BLOG (May 4, 2015), http://berkeleytravaux.com/toward-
new-un-convention-rights-older-persons/ [https://perma.cc/93WV-VHDT] (archived
Sept. 4, 2019).
80. See Francesco Francioni, International Human Rights in an Environmental
Horizon, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 41, 44-45 (2010) (advocating for a human rights approach to
environmental crises).
81. See HANNUM, supra note 8.
82. Dudai, supra note 67, at 18.
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global challenges. It is also critical that concerns about expansion do
not become a way in which to create obstacles or act as a gatekeeper to
the recognition of rights-claims by particular groups or in particular
contexts. In this regard, the application of IHRL to a particular issue
does not reflect an attempt to change IHRL radically; use IHRL to fully
"solve" the underlying social or political issue on its own; apply IHRL
to contexts which do not involve risk to human rights; or redefine
human rights in order to apply to the context. As Bielefeldt points out,
human rights "have a limited scope and do not cover the entire
spectrum of what makes up decent behavior and good and meaningful
life ... human rights are not an all-encompassing ethical code or quasi-
religious comprehensive doctrine" and attempts to frame them in this
way would "not only be politically stupid; it would also amount to
overstating the claims of human rights."83 Indeed, for IHRL such a
reading would clearly set it up to fail as it-like all law-will never be
in the position to singularly resolve complex social, political, and global
challenges as they require multidisciplinary approaches.
Rather, where IHRL is called upon to articulate how it applies to
a particular group or context, it is typically because human rights are
at risk, and it is therefore within the scope of IHRL to respond. The
form this response takes should align to the IHRL framework and its
particular methodology.84 In circumstances where human rights as
defined under IHRL are at risk, it would seem perverse to argue that
IHRL could not be applied because human rights are set within a wider
social or political context; in reality, they always are. To find otherwise
could result in gaps in the coverage of IHRL simply because a new
context, such as artificial intelligence, emerges that was not envisaged
at the time of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Thus, the question is not whether IHRL applies to particular
groups or in particular contexts. Rather, the question is whether it is
sufficient to apply IHRL on a case-by-case basis using the existing law
and mechanisms or whether a dedicated initiative is required to set
standards, even if only declaratory, in order to provide guidance on how
IHRL applies in particular circumstances to enhance compliance and
implementation. In this regard, if IHRL is to develop in an effective
and resilient manner, much greater attention and space is needed to
provide guidance on how IHRL applies to particular groups whose
rights are at risk and to new contexts.
Such an exercise would entail an interpretation and articulation
of how the existing set of legally defined and internationally agreed
human rights, with developed tests to interpret when they have been
83. See HANNUM supra note 8, at 8-9.
84. See Lorna McGregor, Daragh Murray & Vivian Ng, International Human
Rights Law as a Framework for Algorithmic Accountability, 68 INVL & COMP. L.Q. 309,
324-35 (2019) (arguing that IRHL offers an appropriate framework).
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infringed, apply to a particular group or in a particular context. 85 It
would also involve an interpretation and articulation of how the
existing obligations of states and responsibilities of businesses to
prevent human rights being put at risk in the first place; the
establishment of monitoring, oversight, and accountability processes to
identify and act where risks arise; and access to justice, where
allegations are made of human rights violations.
86 The exercise would
therefore not be about changing the nature of IHRL but rather using
its particular, but not exclusive, methodology for the promotion and
protection of human rights, where rights are at risk.
Indeed, this is the point that Alston makes in his lecture when
arguing that the international human rights system has not given
sufficient priority to economic and social rights as a particular
contribution to dealing with poverty.
8 7 He is clear that his point is not
"moving the focus [of the international human rights system] to the
blight of poverty, or to denials of dignity, or even to the need for more
resources for development," but to use the power of the system to
address and contribute to the promotion and protection of economic
and social rights through what he calls "recognition,
institutionalization and accountability."
8 8 He is thus making the case
that as rights are impacted, the international human rights system has
a role to play. However, he is locating this role within a wider set of
solutions rather than claiming that the international human rights
system, or IHRL, is sufficient or should change or widen beyond its
established way of working.
As with the cautionary approach to new law and the focus on
implementation, by refraining claims of expansion as application,
articulation, and mainstreaming of existing IHRL to existing rights
holders and duty bearers, the claim of overexpansion becomes harder
to sustain on the scale often presented.
8 9 This characterization much
more closely reflects the practice in which there are very few attempts
to create new rights but rather the focus is often on clarification of the
normative scope and contours of a right and whether this evolves over
time. For example, much of the focus of the guidelines on prison
standards and detention, such as the recently updated UN Standard
Minimum Rules on the Treatment of Prisoners (renamed the Mandela
Rules), do not reflect efforts to create new rights but to rewrite certain
rules in order to ensure that they reflect current international law.
9 0
85. See id. at 324-35.
86. See id.
87. See Alston, supra note 36.
88. See id.
89. See generally ALISON BRYsK, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2018).
90. U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules), A/C.3/70/L.3 (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/NelsonMandelaRules-E-
ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM4A-K4NP] (archived Sept. 17, 2019).
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Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture produced reports
aimed at understanding the definition of solitary confinement in order
to articulate when the practice amounts to a violation of the prohibition
of torture.9 '
Moreover, where debates are explicitly referred to as entailing
new rights, questions still arise as to whether this is the appropriate
presentation or whether the issue is actually one of norm articulation.
This is a particularly live debate with regard to artificial intelligence,
with some actors arguing that new rights need to be created, such as a
right to encryption or human decision-making, whereas other actors
suggest hat these issues can be dealt with by using the existing human
rights framework. For example, the argument is made that, at least
given current technological capabilities, due process would require a
human decision maker because algorithms cannot make individualized
decisions but rely on group-based correlations, therefore there is no
need for a new right to human decision-making.9 2 Similarly, the
Vatican recently criticized a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Religion or Belief on the grounds that he has created a new
human right to freedom from religion through conscientious
objection.9 3 However, the Special Rapporteur argued that while not
expressly stated, a right to conscientious objection constitutes a logical
deduction from the right to freedom of religion, on the basis of
noncoercion, and therefore cannot be considered mission creep.94
This recasting is important as it enables arguments to create new
rights to be seen in a more exceptional light. This allows for an
assessment of whether enduring and emerging challenges to human
rights reveal particular gaps within IHRL and whether they need to be
filled. In this regard, Gillian MacNaughton, for example, argues in
favor of a right to equality.9 5 She critiques the international human
rights community as addressing horizontal inequalities but not vertical
inequalities of "income, wealth and social outcome either between or
within countries."96 She quotes Philip Alston in his position as Special
Rapporteur as arguing that "a human rights framework that does not
address extreme inequality as one of the drivers of extreme poverty
and as one of the reasons why over one quarter of humanity cannot
91. U.N. Secretary-General, Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur of the Human
Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, ¶ 19, 30, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011).
92. Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding Democracy Amid the Challenges of New
Technology: What Role for the Law of Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT'L L. 9 (2018).
93. U.N. Secretary-General, Interim Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Religion or Belief, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. AJHRC/40/58 (Aug. 5, 2011).
94. Id.
95. See generally Gillian MacNaughton, Vertical Inequalities: Are the SDGs and
Human Rights Up to the Challenge?, 21 INT'L J. HUM. RTs. 1050 (2017).
96. Id. at 1054.
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properly enjoy human rights is doomed to fail."
9 7 However, she
critiques him for treating "vertical inequalities as merely
instrumentally related to human rights."
98 She suggests that "[i]n the
absence of a recognised right to equality, that is economic and social
equality, human rights scholars and practitioners rely upon other
international human rights standards that could indirectly reduce
vertical inequalities."9 9 This is both a substantive and, as discussed
below, a methodological question about what the content of IHRL
should be, and how human rights actors understand and work on the
conditions in which the (non)realization of rights are set.'
0 0
While the current trend tends to be against the creation of new
instruments, for a range of principled and practical reasons, gaps of
different types will still open up. IHRL continues to be a work in
progress and one that has to evolve with the context in which it applies,
which includes new forms of challenges in which human rights are put
at risk, and new power bases beyond the original state focus. In this
regard, IHRL needs to be open to the possibility of gaps emerging that
may need to be filled rather than assume a static position. This is
easier to do in contexts in which IHRL is not presented as engaged in
endless expansion but rather in articulation and application of existing
law to contexts in which human rights are at risk.
IV. THE FUTURE OF IHRL III: OPERATIONALIZATION AND REVALUING
LAW AND THE COURTS
Parts II and III of this Article have emphasized the importance of
IHRL effectively responding to the challenges and threats to human
rights as part of a wider, multidisciplinary approach to the promotion
and protection of human rights. While this may sometimes entail new
substantive or procedural law, where specific gaps in IHRL are
identified, the priority for IHRL-and the international human rights
system-remains implementation, particularly with regard to
operationalization of IHRL, and adaptation to new contexts where
rights are at risk as a means to increase its effectiveness. This final
Part of the Article turns to the methods and approaches needed to
achieve this objective.
Some scholars continue to argue that the international human
rights movement over-relies on law and (quasi-)judicial bodies.
1 0 As




100. See infra Part IV.
101. See Tasioulas, supra note 7, at 1172, 1181-82, 1205 (identifying the flaws of
the current international human rights movement).
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international human rights system, a greater emphasis may have been
placed on standard setting and legal accountability in order to ensure
that individuals could claim their rights.10 2 However, as suggested
throughout this Article, following the achievement of legalization and
judicialization, there has been a shift towards implementation and
adaptation as well as prevention, which necessarily requires a
plurality of methods.1 0 3 This Part will propose ways in which to further
develop approaches to the implementation of human rights,
particularly in terms of operationalization, including ways to address
enduring and emerging challenges to human rights. In doing so, this
Article suggests that through a focus on operationalization, the role of
courts and (quasi-)judicial bodies can also be revalued as part of a
pluralistic approach to human rights and IHRL.
A. Implementation of Human Rights
This Article suggests that the future of the international human
rights system, of which IHRL is a part, lies with assessments of how it
can most effectively contribute to the enduring and emerging
challenges to human rights. This may seem an obvious point, but in
practice is a complex task, particularly given the level of current
threats to human rights. As with all law, IHRL offers a means and a
contribution to addressing threats to human rights. However, the
contribution of other disciplines is also critical, particularly where
risks to human rights emanate from and take place within changes in
scope and structural conditions in society or within the context of major
enduring and emerging global challenges, such as inequality, poverty,
climate change, and artificial intelligence.104 While multidisciplinary
and interdisciplinary approaches to human rights (and social and
political challenges and global problems) are often promoted, in
practice, effective interdisciplinarity is still at an early stage of
development.05 More research and analysis are therefore needed to
determine when and how interdisciplinarity is effectively achieved,
both in terms of dealing with human rights issues in general and as
part of wider social, political, and global problems.
Beyond interdisciplinarity, the effectiveness and implementation
of human rights also relies on the operationalization of IHRL within
the wider strategies, policies, and agendas of key actors that have the
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 12.
105. See Lisa L. Martin, Against Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTRENATIONAL LAW & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE
ART 591, 606 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al. eds., 2013) (emphasizing the "risks associated with
celebrating interdisciplinarity," which implicates a range of disciplines and professions
including "interest groups, social groups and 'epistemic communities'").
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power and ability to effect change.106 Operationalization as an
approach is particularly important as it can result in the integration of
IHRL within the strategic and operational approaches of such actors
and thus avoids IHRL becoming siloed or seen as an "add-on."
1 0 7 It also
helps provide greater attention to prevention rather than ex post-facto
accountability, which while critical, is insufficient to bring about
significant change.'0 8
The state remains the central duty bearer within IHRL, a point
that can often be missed in discourse on human rights.
09 This is
particularly the case when analyzing approaches to dealing with global
challenges, such as artificial intelligence, where actors can focus on the
role of major technology companies while overlooking that states
continue to have obligations with regard to human rights, despite the
power of businesses.1 0 In this regard, the scholarship on and the
practice of IHRL is increasingly recognizing that the state is not a
monolith and for its obligations under IHRL to be effectively realized,
attention needs to be paid to all levels of the state and their
interrelationship."' As Paul Hunt has emphasized, this includes
ministries beyond the foreign office and ministry of justice.112 Thus,
when states receive concluding observations from UN treaty bodies
and recommendations through the Universal Periodic Review process,
the relevant ministries responsible for the portfolios to which the
recommendations relate need to take the lead on their implementation
in coordination with other ministries."3 While this may seem a
straightforward point, ministries outside of the foreign office
responsible for negotiating international law and representing the
state in international human rights forums do not always have a strong
record of integrating IHRL into their policies and practices, even where
the state has ratified treaties that directly connect to their
portfolios." 4 Moreover, states have only recently started to establish
106. See Hunt, supra note 3, at 497 (noting that legal implementation is a
necessary "but not sufficient" part of the "implementation spectrum." Additional
dimensions are required for the "operationalization" of human rights).
107. McGregor, Murray & Ng, supra note 84, at 325 (discussing how international
human rights law imposes specific obligations and expectations on States to protect
human rights and operationalize that responsibility).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 311 (identifying the requirements international human rights law
imposes on States for the prevention of human rights violations, including monitoring
and oversight safeguards, accountability responsibilities, and provision of remedies for
those impacted by violations).
110. See id. at 332.
111. See id.
112. See Hunt, supra note 3, at 505-06 (emphasizing that the Universal Periodic
Review process engages a wide range of those responsible for civil and political rights
and their implementation).
113. See id.
114. See Lorna McGregor, Should Commitments to Implementation Factor into
Elections to the Human Rights Council?, EJIL TALK! (Nov. 8, 2016),
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national implementation and follow-up mechanisms to coordinate the
implementation of recommendations from international and regional
human rights bodies.115
Operationalization of IHRL within states is not only a horizontal
question but also relates to local and municipal governmental
authorities. While this has been a central part of literature on the
globalization of human rights and is recognized in practice,1 16 it has
only recently begun to receive attention in mainstream IHRL
literature.11 7 This is because local governments take many decisions
that affect economic and social rights, such as education, housing, and
social care. Economic and social rights are beginning to be prioritized,
even in states such as the United Kingdom that have not incorporated
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
into domestic law.1 18 In a recent resolution, the UN Human Rights
Council underscored the importance of local government as a human
rights actor, noting that, "given its proximity to people and being at the
grass-roots level, one of the important functions of local government is
to provide public services that address local needs and priorities
related to the realization of human rights at the local level."1 19 Oomen
and Baumgirtel also observe that "local authorities hold the potential
to reinforce the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law." 120
The importance of local and municipal governments as human
rights actors is also becoming increasingly apparent in response to
central global challenges, such as climate change and artificial
intelligence. For example, employment of big data and new
technologies by state agencies and the emergence of smart cities, pose
significant risks to human rights.1 2 1 Smart cities have been promoted
as transformative to the administration of cities, particularly from an
efficiency perspective.1 2 2 However, as they rely on big data analytics
and machine learning, they raise inherent threats to the right to
https://www.ejiltalk.org/should-commitments-to-implementation-factor-into-elections-
to-the-human-rights-councill [https://perma.cc/UP2J-HFAK] (archived Sept. 17, 2019).
115. See id.
116. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of
Cultural Rights, 1 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/55 (Jan. 4, 2018).
117. See Barbara Oomen & Moritz Baumgirtel, Frontier Cities: The Rise of Local
Authorities as an Opportunity for International Human Rights Law, 29 EUR. J. INT'L L.
607, 608 (2018).
118. See First Minister's Advisory Group on Human Rights Leadership,
Recommendations for a New Human Rights Framework to Improve People's Lives 46
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://humanrightsleadership.scot/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/First-
Ministers-Advisory-Group-on-Human-Rights-Leadership-Final-report-for-
publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WGW-HLA6] (archived Sept. 17, 2019).
119. See Human Rights Council Res. 39/7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39[L.8 (Sept. 21,
2018).
120. See Oomen & Baumgdrtel, supra note 117, at 625.
121. See Rob Kitchin, The Realtimeness ofSmart Cities, 8 TECNOSCIENZA: ITALIAN
J. Scl. & TECH. STUD. 19, 32-33 (2017).
122. See id. at 34.
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privacy and can result in discrimination.123 Depending on the decisions
municipal actors make using the data collected, they potentially raise
risks to other human rights, including access to housing and
education.124 These risks could be aggravated depending on how the
technology and data are integrated. The types of technologies used in
smart cities and how the data is amalgamated, shared, and accessed
all vary. However, at its extreme, it could mean that an array of
technology used in smart cities, from home sensors, to automated
traffic lights, to live facial recognition technologies in public spaces,
may then use and produce data that is fed into a central database,
which itself may consist of integrated public and private sets, such as
health, law enforcement, and education data.125 Such scenarios raise
questions of a "surveillance society" and the extent to which the
insights gleaned from the smart city are shared with other parts of
government or other actors, such as companies and other states.126 The
human rights impact of smart cities, the models for their governance
and regulation, and the technology and data upon which they rely are
only beginning to be researched and analyzed. These potential
developments further emphasize the increasing centrality of municipal
governments to human rights and the importance, therefore, of
operationalizing IHRL within their agendas.
Indeed, the critical role of local government has recently been
underscored in relation to the use and live testing of facial recognition
technology in the United States. This technology connects to databases
on individuals suspected of having committed crimes. However, it has
been documented to be inaccurate, particularly in relation to nonwhite
nonmales, as well as heightening the possibilities for human rights
violations and changing the way in which agencies, such as the police,
work with wider implications for democracy.'2 7 The American Civil
Liberties Union and other human rights organizations have therefore
challenged its use and live testing.128 Local governments and city
administrations have emerged as central human rights actors in this
regard, with some US cities already introducing a moratorium on the
use of facial recognition technology until the technical and human
rights risks can be attended to.1
29
123. See McGregor, Murray & Ng, supra note 84, at 316.
124. See id. at 310.
125. See Kitchin, supra note 121, at 25.
126. See McGregor, Murray & Ng, supra note 84, at 331-32.
127. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Civil Rights Coalition
Opposed Facial Recognition Technology in Letter to Detroit Board of Police
Commissioners (Aug. 1, 2019) (on file with author) (stating that "facial recognition
technology is racially biased and poses a grave threat to privacy").
128. See id.
129. See Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans
Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/ 14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html
[https://perma.ccIW77S-MDN4] (archived Sept. 17, 2019).
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Accordingly, significant work still needs to be done on building
capacity and institutional mechanisms to ensure that IHRL is
operationalized across governments. This is not a small task in that
mainstreaming human rights creates significant demands on the
promotion of norm literacy and clarification, if these new actors are to
be able to navigate the intersections, tensions, and synergies among
competing rights-and other-claims.
Beyond the state, a key priority continues to be the embedding of
human rights within businesses in line with the UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights and the proposed treaty. 130 The recent
incidents involving large technology companies, such as the data access
by Cambridge Analytica from Facebook and the role of Facebook in
Myanmar, highlight the potential for major technology companies to
impact human rights.3 1 However, they also raise questions on the
adequacy of the current IHRL framework where it does not impose
direct obligations, but responsibilities on businesses.132 Within this
context, operationalizing human rights within the strategies and
operations of businesses becomes even more important in order to
ensure that risks to human rights are identified, and oversight and
monitoring mechanisms are in place.'3 3 In this regard, while certain
tools such as human rights impact assessments and social auditing of
businesses to certify if they are "human rights compliant" have been
developed, much more work needs to be done to fully develop the
content and nature of businesses' responsibilities to respect human
rights. Moreover, a particularly neglected issue in this regard relates
to the right to an effective remedy for business-related harm to human
rights. This is both in relation to the procedural obligation to provide
access to a remedy as well as the substantive reparation required to
repair harm. This is therefore an area that requires prioritization.134
Given that human rights issues arise within social and political
contexts as well as in relation to global challenges, operationalization
of human rights also needs to be thought of in relation to the social and
political movements that work on these contexts and challenges. This
connects with the concept of "orchestration," whereby an international
130. See John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations 'Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, ¶ 1-16, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011).
131. See Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on Myanmar, U.N. Doc A/HRC/39/64, at 13-14 (Sept. 12, 2018); Kevin
Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout
Widens, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/
facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html [https://perma.cc/CL42-A7YM] (archived
Sept. 17, 2019).
132. See Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 12.
133. See McGregor, Murray & Ng, supra note 84.
134. See G.A. Res 38/13, U.N. Doc. A/38/13 (July 6, 2018).
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organization "enlists and supports intermediary actors to address
target actors [such as states] in pursuit of IGO governance goals."
135
While states and businesses are often the focus of operationalization
due to their position as duty bearers, social movements as a third
category for operationalization have rarely received attention in
mainstream human rights scholarship, particularly legal scholarship,
although their critical role in the orchestration of human rights has
been the subject of scholarly attention.136 Their role has two
dimensions. First, it relates to conveying the relevance of IHRL to such
contexts and challenges.3 7 This is not a new point. Human rights
scholars have long pointed to the importance and increased
effectiveness of human rights and IHRL, particularly judicial
decisions, when embedded within the agendas of wider social or
political movements.1 38 This was a key point made by James Cavallaro
and Stephanie Brewer in their article on the implementation of
decisions by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.'
39 Karima
Bennoune also points out the "reality on the ground" that "[h]uman
rights advocates in many places are working with, supporting and
building social movements, and working to mobilize broader
constituencies, sometimes at risk of their very lives."1
40
However, in the Global North, the issue has come to the forefront
more recently in light of a number of popular movements that either
do not appear to have considered human rights or have been hostile to
them.141 Dudai reflects that a
key factor in re-energizing human rights is to reconnect human rights with social
movements struggles on the ground. Human rights-as slogans, values,
methods, laws, and institutional machinery-are most effectively deployed not
in the abstract but in conjunction with and in support of specific campaigns, and
their role and function should be to assist in such concrete struggles.
1 4 2
A shift, therefore, may be needed, not only in articulating the role
that human rights and IHRL can play within social movements but
also for human rights institutions and the human rights community to
engage with a wider set of disciplines and in partnership develop
135. See Pegram, supra note 65.
136. See BOUAVENTURA DE SOUSA & CESAR RODRIGUEZ-GARAVITO, LAW AND
GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2005).
137. See Langford, supra note 5, at 79; Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 12, at 505.
138. See id.
139. See James Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional
Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American
Court, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 768, 770, 788 (2008).
140. See Bennoune, supra note 10.
141. See Douzinas, supra note 53, at 51 (noting that even in an era of human rights
popularity, there has never been a more significant discrepancy between the global north
and south in terms of life expectancy, wealth, and human rights violations).
142. Dudai, supra note 67, at 18.
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integrated approaches to addressing these challenges. This may seem
an obvious point, but IHRL and actors that primarily work on IHRL
have not always had a history of integrating into wider approaches.14 3
It returns to the issue of scope conditions discussed in the first Part of
this Article in that human rights issues are integrally connected with
context and can be put at risk due to other social issues. However, they
are unlikely to be resolved through IHRL alone, and thus the effective
promotion and protection of human rights is also conditional on
addressing wider scope conditions.
As already discussed, how this is done is not by claiming that
human rights or IHRL offer the exclusive solution to a particular social
issue or that IHRL should widen beyond what it can offer. Rather, the
operationalization agenda focuses on embedding and demonstrating
the particular role, methodology, and value of IHRL and a human
rights-based approach more broadly as contributions to addressing
wider social agendas. As Dudai suggests, "the lesson from this should
perhaps be acceptance of the limitations of human rights in providing
a full mobilizing vision, and recognition of a more modest role for
human rights in serving as one component in other social/political
visions."144
Second, existing literature often discusses the barriers to the
international human rights movement for nonlawyers due to the
dominance of lawyers in the field.145 However, this issue is not uni-
directional. The embedding of human rights and IHRL within social
agendas requires the sensitization of legal actors as well as human
rights actors (that often focus on the documentation of human rights
violations and the employment of legal strategies to combat them) to
the wider contexts in which human rights issues arise. This requires a
recognition of how the approaches they undertake fit within a wider
and multidisciplinary approach to human rights and to the social and
political contexts concerned. This can require a significant shift in the
methodology and approach of human rights organizations. In 2004,
Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch reflected on the challenges for
human rights organizations in addressing economic, social, and
cultural rights.14 6 His article was not normatively opposed to
addressing these rights, but he reflected on how well the methodology
of his organization, at the time "shaming and the generation of public
pressure," fit with such rights. 14 7 This is an interesting reflection on
methodology and the extent to which it shapes the ability to work on
143. See Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 12, at 501 (discussing the dominance of
lawyers within the international human rights system).
144. Dudai, supra note 67, at 17.
145. See Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 12, at 501.
146. See Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical
Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63, 63
(2004).
147. See id. at 64.
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particular rights' issues or locate them within broader movements.
More recently, in the wake of the Grenfell Tower fire in London,
Andrew Fagan argued that a number of human rights organizations
made calls for legal accountability but failed to call for the examination
of the wider social and political structures that may have enabled the
situation in the first place.148 This again points to the types of
methodologies employed by human rights organizations and whether
they are sufficient. Equally, while IHRL and certain legal mechanisms
may be ill-suited to examine the structural conditions that led to a
human rights violation,149 greater efforts can be made by certain
legally focused human rights actors to understand and situate
themselves within wider approaches to addressing social and global
challenges and to articulate the nature and limitations of their
contribution within a wider matrix.1
50 It also emphasizes again that
IHRL does not offer all the solutions to the protection of human
rights.5 1 Thus, other approaches focused on structural conditions and
the scope conditions discussed at the beginning of this Article will also
be critical to whether human rights are protected, but may not be fully
within the remit of IHRL specifically.1
5 2
However, like the operationalization agenda with states and
businesses, challenges remain with demonstrating the relevance and
value of human rights, IHRL, and a wider human rights-based
approach to social agendas, including the role of international
institutions and courts.5 3 Significant work and theorizing are
therefore required on how IHRL and the broader international human
rights system can operate dynamically among the local, national,
transnational, and international levels. A part of this challenge relates
to demonstrating the particular contributions of human rights and
IHRL to wider social movements. This can be challenging as actors
involved in such movements may have preconceptions or only partial,
narrow understandings of what human rights entail.1
54 For example,
148. See Fagan, supra note 6, at 303 (noting that the United Kingdom's human
rights community, "where it commented at all," called for legal inquiry, but disregarded
the political importance of the Grenfell fire).
149. JAMES NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2007); see also Alice
Donald & Anne-Katrin Speck, The European Court of Human Rights'Remedial Practice
and its Impact on the Execution of Judgments, 19 HUM RTS. L. REV. 83, 96 (2019).
150. See Fagan, supra note 6, at 304 (discussing how most of the human rights
actors "made recommendations that merely reinforced the existing institutions and none
questioned whether, for example, a right of individual legal remedy or redress might fall
far short of addressing the collective, systemic challenges or deprivation, inequality and
marginalization in the UK").
151. See id.
152. See supra Part II.
153. See Douzinas, supra note 53, at 52 (noting that "the absence of human rights
demands in Madrid, Athens, or Occupy Wall Street indicated their limited relevance for
the most important movement of our times.").
154. See supra Part III.
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in the artificial intelligence sector, an actor recently commented to the
author of this Article that they had not previously thought of looking
at IHRL as part of the strategies employed to address the social impact
of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies, as they saw it
narrowly as about privacy and data protection rather than about ways
of understanding harm more broadly. They commented that now that
they were engaging with IHRL, they saw that in some ways they had
already been using IHRL concepts without labelling them as such. 155
Care also has to be taken in how the connections between the
human rights movement and social approaches are forged to avoid the
impression that human rights actors are "parachuting" into social
struggles, which actors have worked on for many years without
attention from major national or international bodies. The embedding
of human rights and IHRL within social movements therefore has to
be approached from a perspective of equality and partnership and not
appropriation and instrumentalization.
With all three approaches to operationalizing human rights
within the strategies, policies, and agendas of states, businesses, and
social movements, opportunities arise for dispelling myths about
human rights and IHRL and demonstrating its concrete and practical
value and contributions. Equally, by pluralizing the actors responsible
for promoting and protecting human rights, the number of interpreters
and appliers of rights increases.1 56 This risks a plurality of
interpretations and a diffusion and divergence of interpretation and
meaning of human rights.15 7 It also risks the instrumentalization of
human rights to fit actors' agendas, which inevitably can lead to a
"pick-n-mix approach."158 For example, this is a critique that has been
made within the approaches of technology companies to ethical and
human rights-based approaches to artificial intelligence.15 9 Where
human rights are taken up by social movements, there is also the risk
that they become associated with one particular political view and thus
alienate other communities, or that concessions are made on aspects of
155. See id.
156. See Megret, supra note 76, at 495 (defining the "pluralization of human
rights" as the increased recognition of needs of specific categories of humans as "worthy
of a specific human rights protection").
157. See id.
158. Hannah Miller, From 'Rights-Based" to 'Wights-Framed" Approaches: A
Social Constructionist View of Human Rights Practice, 14 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 915, 925
(2010).
159. Eric Newcomer, What Google's Al Principles Left Out, BLOOMBERG (June 8,
2018), https://www.bloomberg.cominews/articles/2018-06-08/what-google-s-ai-principles
-left-out [https://perma.cc/W'8-P7B5] (archived Sept. 17, 2019); Google: New Guiding
Principles on Al show progress but still fall short on human rights protections, ARTICLE
19 (June 14, 2018), https://www.articlel9.org/resources/google-new-guiding-principles-
on-ai-show-progress-but-still-fall-short-on-human-rights-protections/
[https://perma.ccfL5QG-Y9H3] (archived Sept. 17, 2019).
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human rights to fit with a wider social agenda.16 0 These risks do not,
necessarily, warrant the rejection of the operationalization of human
rights with such actors, for example, but are factors that will have to
be addressed, navigated, and studied from an effectiveness
perspective, as the operationalization of IHRL develops and matures.
B. Revaluing Courts
As already noted, some commentators continue to critique the
international human rights system as overly legal and judicialized.
161
This does not reflect a new critique.162 Yet, as argued in the first Part
of this Article, without recognizing the critical role the legalization and
judicialization of rights has played in the protection of human rights,
many of these critiques of IHRL underplay the transformational
achievements of the international human rights system across the
globe. Moreover, claims of a dominance of legalization and
judicialization are not necessarily an accurate reflection of what
happens in practice, particularly in states where legal strategies have
formed part of wider campaigns.163 However, at least in the earlier
phases of the international human rights system, (quasi-)judicial
bodies were seen as central institutions both to develop IHRL and as a
means of accountability, particularly in states with ineffective or
unavailable judicial systems. It was in part because those institutions
were available and the most concrete means of achieving an outcome
for individuals and groups. It was also because other approaches, such
as the prevention of human rights violations have, until recently,
remained underdeveloped in comparison, although this is now on the
agenda of the UN Human Rights Council.1
64
In this regard, some of the critiques of the dominance of courts
have emanated from the absence or insufficient attention and
investment in other approaches. This has led both to a devaluing of
courts and over expectation of what they can achieve. As central
institutions within the international human rights landscape, the
expectations on such bodies-particularly in the absence of other types
160. Jutta Joachim, Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs,
and Women's Rights, 47 INT'L STUD. Q. 247, 269 (2003) (suggesting that "the political
opportunity structure" is most constraining at the beginning of the agenda-setting
process, but opportunities for strategic manipulation may emerge with increased
influence of human rights actors).
161. See Tasioulas, supra note 7; see also MOYN, supra note 8.
162. See supra Part IV.A.
163. See Gathii, supra note 15, at 62 (discussing the integration of the East African
Court as one strategy of challenging human rights abuses that is part of a broader set of
strategies, including raising awareness by human rights groups and business actors, in
a variety of venues).
164. See Hunt, supra note 3, at 520 (discussing the U.N.'s recent focus on
prevention of human rights violations through Human Rights up Front).
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of approaches and institutions-have been high.165 While a different
branch of international law, current critiques of the International
Criminal Court provide interesting analogies to the critiques of some
human rights bodies. Reflecting on these critiques, some commentators
have noted that the expectations of what could be achieved through a
judicial body set it up for (perceived) failure.16 6 For example, Kersten
notes that, both the court and its
most fervent champions ... insisted that the Court would end impunity for
international crimes, put victims front and center in all of its work, transcend
global power relations, deter mass atrocities, hold the most powerful to account,
promote reconciliation . . . you name it. It's a laundry list of things that the ICC
didn't achieve because it couldn't achieve them.1 6 7
In taking a fuller approach to the realization of human rights,
particularly through an expanded version of operationalization, it
becomes possible not only to rebut claims that the international human
rights structures over-rely on courts but also to revalue courts within
plural methodologies to advance human rights. Relieving the pressure
and expectation on courts as the "main" vehicle through which to
deliver human rights enables a reimagining of their role within a
pluralized landscape.'6 8 Much of the current discussion on (quasi-)
judicial bodies focuses on funding cuts, backlogs, and non-
implementation of judgments. This has forced debates and concrete
policy changes on whether they should be forums for individual justice
or whether they should focus on structural issues and repetitive
violations.169  Seeking more effective plural forms of the
implementation of human rights may assist in refraining the narrative
around courts and enable them to reclaim their role as part of wider
human rights movements and campaigns and also as aspirational
institutions.
This is particularly important as the critiques of the dominance of
courts overlook the significant contributions courts have made not only
in developing the corpus of IHRL but in delivering justice for
individuals and groups.170 In this regard, courts are critical
institutions in protecting individuals against majoritarian




169. See Steven Greer & Faith Wylde, Has the European Court of Human Rights
Become a 'Small Claims Tribunal' & Why, IfAt All, Does it Matter?, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 145 (2017); Dilek Kurban, Forsaking Individual Justice: the Implications of the
European Court of Human Rights' Pilot Judgment Procedure for Victims of Gross and
Systematic Violations, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 731, 733-35 (2016).
170. See Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, The Evolution of the Right of Individuals to
Seise the European Court of Human Rights, 12 J. HIST. INT'L L. 267, 273-74 (2010).
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tendencies.1 71 Judicial forums can be ill-suited for diagnosing and
addressing the structural causes of human rights violations. Moreover,
courts, particularly at the international level, are attuned to the
challenges of specificity in reparation orders, given their lack of
detailed knowledge of the landscape in each member state.
172 At the
same time, courts such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
have made critical contributions to addressing structural conditions
that facilitate human rights violations within their jurisprudence on
reparations, for example.1 73 This role is enhanced where the parties in
a case address specific reparation orders in their pleadings with
supporting evidence which can reduce courts' perceptions that they are
ill-equipped or have insufficient information to make specific
reparation orders that address wider policies, practices or structural
conditions.174 These reparation orders can then provide advocates and
civil society with a concrete tool to pursue in law and policy reform as
a means of compliance with the decision.'75 Court decisions that
protect the rights of minorities or groups in vulnerable or marginalized
positions have also led to change by providing a narrative for
governments to reform laws or policies, in the face of resistance by
parts of the population. Laurence Helfer and Erik Voeten argue, for
example, that international courts can "help overcome domestic
opposition to policy change under particular institutional and political
circumstances," using the example of the European Court of Human
Rights' case law on LGBT rights to illustrate their point.176 When part
of wider approaches to human rights, courts can be important bodies
in delivering social change. Courts can therefore be a part of the wider
operationalization agenda without being the sole prism through which
expectations are made of the international human rights system.
171. See Gathii, supra note 15, at 54 (discussing the "solidified" authority of the
Court "among individuals and groups interested in promotion and protection of human
rights").
172. See Donald & Speck, supra note 149, at 96.
173. See Ruth Rubio-Marin & Clara Sandoval, Engendering the Reparations
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton
Field Judgment, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 1062, 1064 (2011) (discussing that reparation should
not just return victims of human rights abuses to their original circumstances, but,
instead, should "aim to transform or change the pre-existing situation").
174. See Donald & Speck, supra note 149, at 96.
175. Rubio-Marin & Sandoval, supra note 173, at 1091 (stating that reparations
"enter the domain of institutional reform and policy-making by requiring states to
address structural shortcomings" in human rights protections.").
176. Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal
Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT'L ORG. 77 (2014).
[VOL. 52:12811312
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
V. CONCLUSION
Unlike some commentators who depict IHRL as an uncritical
branch of international law or the international human rights system
more generally as unreflective, this Article, has suggested that
scholarship and practice on human rights indicates a critical and self-
reflective edge, aimed at assessing and improving IHRL in order to
effectively address the significant challenges to the enjoyment of
human rights around the world. Drawing on this literature and
practice, this Article has identified three key priorities for the
development of IHRL which are necessary to fulfill if IHRL is to remain
relevant and resilient in a changing world. The challenges and
pushback IHRL faces cannot be reduced to one source or explanation.
Rather, they are multifactorial and shift depending on the actor and
point in time. They also cannot be separated from the wider pushback
against the international rule of law and international institutions or
from the structural, societal and political changes in society.
Effectively addressing this pushback therefore requires equally
complex and nuanced approaches. IHRL and its institutions cannot
achieve this alone, but they need to be located within and interact with.
other disciplinary approaches. This Article suggests that this can be
more effectively achieved where IHRL embeds within the agendas of
key actors that are capable of protecting human rights. These actors
include state agencies, which requires a mainstreaming of human
rights across state agencies as well as at the level of local government.
This is in addition to the deepening of the business and human rights
agenda and the integration of human rights principles within the
agendas of social movements. Inevitably, the mainstreaming of human
rights in this way will introduce new challenges through the
pluralization of the actors engaged in the promotion and protection of
human rights. However, it is a necessary approach for IHRL to make
a meaningful impact where human rights are at risk.
This Article has acknowledged that IHRL and its institutions face
significant pushback. However, it has equally argued that this is not a
time for retraction or standing still. Rather, space needs to remain for
the development of new substantive and procedural law, where an
analysis of IHRL in context reveals gaps in the promotion and
protection of human rights. However, for the most part, the focus on
the evolution of IHRL should be on ensuring its implementation in
dealing with enduring and emerging challenges for human rights.
Accordingly, this Article has proposed a much clearer distinction
between the exceptional circumstances in which the creation of new
rights is proposed and situations in which IHRL needs to be
interpreted and adapted to fill protection-gaps arising for particular
groups who are not enjoying their rights in practice or because of new
contexts or global challenges that introduce new rights' issues.
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Within this context, human rights scholarship and practice have
moved beyond a focus on standard setting and judicialization, although
both remain important components, towards complex, multilayered,
and multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches to human
rights. Scholars have started to develop "thicker" approaches to the
development of JHRL, within which this Article aligns and builds upon.
These include a four-strand approach.177 First, on legalization,
advocacy, and socialization, what Stephen Hopgood et al. call the
"mainstream" approach to date.'78 Second, engaging, bargaining, and
negotiating with backlash.179 Third, framing or translating rights to
resonate with local contexts.18 0 Fourth, examining synergies with
other agendas, like the Sustainable Development Goals.1
8 1 This is a
significant and ambitious agenda, which will be met with obstacles,
challenges, instrumentalization of rights, and dead ends. However, if
JHRL is to fully operationalize and result in the realization of human
rights for those most affected, it needs to be able to embed within the
contexts in which rights are affected and to partner and contribute to
wider agendas and strategies that can benefit rights' protection, either
directly or through addressing scope and structural conditions.
177. HUMAN RIGHTS FUTURES, supra note 59. The author is also grateful to Dr.
Ahmed Shaheed for this reflections on this point.
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